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Abstract—In several countries, independent wind
power producers have the possibility to participate in
short-term electricity markets for trading their produc-
tion. However, the limited predictability of the wind
resource may lead to differences between produced
and contracted energy, thus generating energy imbal-
ances. This may result in the payment of imbalance
penalties, which leads to a reduction of the compet-
itiveness of wind power generation. This paper de-
velops a methodology, suitable for independent wind
power producers, that permits them to participate in
an efficient way simultaneously in several sequen-
tial electricity markets, namely day-ahead and intra-
day markets. The considered intraday market takes
place through a continuous trading mechanism. The
imbalance cost reduction related to the adjustment
participation in the intraday market is assessed using
a real-world test case.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IND power is the fastest growing renew-able electricity generating technology. For in-
stance, the target for the next decades aims at
obtaining a high share of wind power in electricity
generation in Europe [1]. To make such develop-
ments possible, one of the present challenges is to
increase the integration of wind power in the new
electricity market context. Nowadays, independent
wind power producers have the possibility to par-
ticipate in electricity markets for trading wind power
production. More precisely, these producers may be
allowed to participate in several sequential short-
term electricity markets, such as day-ahead and
adjustment markets [2] [3].
For participating in a short-term electricity market,
a decision has to be made about the amount of
energy to bid [4]. The decision has to be made a
given amount of time prior to the actual delivery,
with imperfect knowledge about the future power
generation. At the delivery time, differences be-
tween contracted and produced energy (constituting
energy imbalances) may lead to the payment of
penalties [5]. The wind power producer is exposed
to such penalties due to the variable nature of the
wind resource as well as to the limited predictability
of wind production. As a consequence, the decision
about the amount of energy to bid is based on
short-term wind power prediction tools that give an
estimate of the future power generation [6].
In the state of the art, advanced trading strategies
have been proposed for bidding in the day-ahead
market in order to reduce the imbalance penalties.
A stochastic programming method is proposed in [7]
for generating optimal wind power production bids
for a day-ahead power market. The estimation of the
uncertainty associated to the wind power forecast
is used in [8] for deriving optimal bidding strategies
for participating in the day-ahead electricity market.
The risk related to the imbalance penalties for the
independent power producer has been considered in
[9] where a strategy based on utility risk assessment
is proposed. A mean-risk approach is proposed by
the authors in [10], where the risk is measured
through the conditional value at risk.
Participation in the intraday market can be done
through the use more accurate wind power forecasts
for bidding and, as a consequence, it may poten-
tially reduce the risk related to imbalance penalties.
More accurate wind power forecasts result from
considering the updates that can be made available
in time closer to the energy delivery. The benefits
from the participation in the intraday market have
been verified in [11] for the Spanish market. For the
NordPool market, the possibility to reduce imbalance
penalties through the intraday market participation
has been studied in [12].
The present work proposes a decision making
method for the optimal participation of independent
wind power producers in day-ahead and intraday
electricity markets. The participation in the intra-
day market is considered as a way for the wind
power producer to reduce the imbalance penalties
resulting from the participation in the corresponding
day-ahead market. The considered intraday market
takes place through a continuous trading mecha-
nism. The benefits of the proposed methodology are
demonstrated using real-world data of wind power
generation as well as of electricity market prices.
II. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
A. Electricity Markets
Electricity markets are usually complex due the
amount of energy trading possibilities they offer, to
their rules, and to the way they operate, which is
usually market-specific. In this work, the wind power
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producer is supposed to participate in both the day-
ahead and intraday markets.
1) The Day-Ahead Market: Day-ahead electricity
market generally takes place through power ex-
change session [2]. Each session has a gate open-
ing and gate closing time as well as a fixing time.
The time delivery scope is the 24 hours of the fol-
lowing day. Participants in day-ahead markets have
to submit their quantity-price bid during the period
between the gate opening and the gate closing time.
The energy contracts for each participants and the
system price are determined by marginal pricing; all
bids are aggregated to form a curve for purchases
and a curve for sales for each of the 24 hours of
the day following the gate closure time. The point
at which the two curves intersect within each hour
determines the system price, also called spot price,
which in turn establishes the trading result for each
participant for that hour. For markets including differ-
ent regions, regional spot market prices are derived
from system prices taking into account transmission
bottlenecks [13].
2) The Intraday Market: An intraday market is
defined here as a market which gives the possibility
for transactions between market parties between the
day-ahead market gate closing time and the final
notification. This notification is the last moment in
time where a market party is allowed to change
the energy program which will form the basis of the
imbalance calculation [14].
From the independent power producer’s point of
view, the goal for participating in an intraday market
is related to the need for additional trade and a
change of position after the day-ahead market gate
closing time. More precisely, market parties may
want to cover for open positions for reducing the
imbalance risk.
During the intraday market period, trade can take
place through several different mechanisms such
as Over The Counter (OTC), power exchange ses-
sions or continuous trading [14]. The intraday market
mechanism considered in the present study is a con-
tinuous trading one. Trading takes place in a central
exchange where standard products are traded on a
first come first serve basis: the first matching offer
to a bid (or vice versa) is rewarded and fixed into
two bilateral transactions between the seller and the
buyer. Such a pricing mechanism is denoted as pay
as bid pricing.
Figure 1 describes the example of a combined
participation in the Elspot and Elbas markets from
NordPool in Denmark. Bids in the Elspot are pro-
posed before the gate closure time at 12 : 00 the
day before the delivery. The Elbas intraday market
takes place through a power exchange continuous
trading mechanism. In the example, bids in the Elbas
market are proposed in the central exchange 6 hours
before the delivery time.
B. The Independent Wind Power Producer
The considered independent wind power producer
is supposed to participate in the electricity market
in order to sell its power production. In the present
study, the bids proposed by the wind power producer
for both the day-ahead and intraday markets are
only selling, and not buying bids. The possibility to
propose buying bids in the intraday market is not
considered.
The wind power producer is assumed to be
balance-responsible. It is thus liable to pay penalties
for the energy imbalances it generates according to
the market rules. In the present study, an energy
imbalance is defined as the difference between the
energy delivered by the wind power producer and
the sum of the energy contracted in the day-ahead
and intraday markets.
The total capacity of the wind farm is considered
to be small enough so that its owner does not
possess sufficient market power. In addition, the
day-ahead market is considered to be competitive
and composed of a relatively high number of market
participants. In such a case, in the electricity market
context, the wind power producer is considered to
be a price taker.
III. MARKET MODELS
This section describes the bidding model for the
day-ahead and intraday markets, as well the mar-
ket settlement model for the same markets. The
subscript 0 refers to the day-ahead market, while
the subscript 1 will refer to the intraday market.
B0 and C0 are relative to the day-ahead market
bid and contract, respectively. Similarly, B1 and C1
are relative to the intraday market bid and contract,
respectively.
A. Day-Ahead Market Model
Following the assumptions regarding the indepen-
dent wind power producer in section II-B, the pro-
posed quantity-price bids for the day-ahead market
are assumed to be price independent bids, at bid
price piB0 equal to zero. In the present work, the
bid energy quantity EB0Ti for the delivery period Ti
is determined using the most recent update of the
wind power forecast PˆWFtc+k/tc , available at time tc:
B0Ti :
{
ΠB0Ti = 0
EB0Ti = Pˆ
WF
tc+k/tc
×∆t
(1)
where B0Ti constitutes the bid in the day-ahead
market for the period Ti. The index k is the horizon,
also called look-ahead time of the prediction; it is
selected so that the prediction PˆWFtc+k/tc corresponds
to the prediction of the mean wind power production
for the time period Ti. The symbol ∆t is the market
time step, also called Program Time Unit (PTU). It
corresponds to the length of the period Ti.
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Fig. 1: Example of a combined participation in the Elspot and Elbas markets (NordPool). Bids in the Elbas
market are proposed 6 hours before the delivery time.
At the market settlement, the wind power producer
bid is always accepted as a consequence to the
price taker hypothesis at zero price. The system
price is determined by the other participants’ bids
and the energy contract equals the energy bid. Thus:
Contract0Ti :
{
ΠC0Ti = Π
C0market
Ti
EC0Ti = E
B0
Ti
(2)
where Contract0Ti constitutes the day-ahead mar-
ket contract for the period Ti.
B. Intraday Market Model
The considered intraday market is based on a
continuous trading mechanism. Contrary to the case
of day-ahead market participation, the bid is not
always accepted. A trade occurs when the selling
and buying bids match. The contract price ΠC1Ti then
equals the bid price ΠB1Ti , which results from the pay
as bid pricing. The contracted energy quantity in the
intraday market depends on the buying bids of the
other participants.
Modeling the trading mechanism which gives the
contracted energy from the bid energy quantity is
necessary for simulating and evaluating the bid-
ding strategies. Here, we propose to model the
contracted energy quantity EC1Ti as a proportion
of the bid energy quantity EB1Ti . This proportion is
expressed by a coefficient α, and models the bid
acceptance:
Contract1Ti :
{
ΠC1Ti = Π
B1
Ti
EC1Ti = α× E
B1
Ti
(3)
The energy traded in the intraday market for a
given delivery period can be traded during the period
when the intraday market is open, at different price.
The available public information from the market
operator for the intraday trading prices consists of
the minimum, the maximum and the mean of the
price of the energy traded for each delivery time
period. The minimum, mean and maximum of the
trading price Π1Ti inform about the distribution of this
trading price for each delivery period Ti. Here, the
intraday trading price Π1Ti distribution is modeled as
a triangular distribution using the minimum, mean
and maximum prices which are public data. An
example is shown in the upper plot of Figure 2.
The proposed market settlement model consists
in modeling the proportion of accepted energy by
the probability of having the bid accepted for a given
bid price. Since a trade occurs when the selling and
buying bids match, an estimation of the probability
of having the bid accepted for a given bid price
can be the probability of having the bid price ΠB1Ti
inferior to the trading price Π1Ti . This is illustrated
in the lower part of Figure 2. Such an estimation
of the α proportion only considers the bid price to
determine whether the bid is accepted or not, and
does not consider neither the market liquidity nor the
time when the intraday bid is proposed.
α = prob(ΠB1Ti < Π
1
Ti)
= 1− prob(Π1Ti ≤ Π
B1
Ti
)
= 1− FΠ1
Ti
(ΠB1Ti ) (4)
where FΠ1
Ti
is the cumulated distribution function of
the trading price Π1 for the delivery period Ti.
The quantity-price bid for the intraday market re-
sults from a decision making method which aims at
reducing the imbalance penalties paid by the wind
power producer. Such a method is formulated in the
next section IV-C after having derived the expression
of the imbalance penalties.
IV. FORMULATION OF THE INTRADAY MARKET
BIDDING PROBLEM
A. Imbalance Penalty Model
The Transmission System Operator (TSO) is res-
ponsible for maintaining the physical balance be-
tween production and consumption. As mentioned in
section II-B, the wind power producer is assumed to
be a balance responsible entity which is thus paying
a market imbalance price for any contribution to
the global system imbalance. This section describes
why energy imbalances may lead to economical risk
for the wind power producer. The proposed model
is the extension of the regulation market model
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Fig. 2: Upper: Example of modeling the intraday
trading price through a triangular distribution.
Lower: Example of the estimation of the α
proportion in the Elbas intraday market (NordPool)
the 11/04/2004 at 11.00 AM (prices in DKK/MWh).
presented by the authors in [10] for the participation
in the day-ahead market only.
1) Participation only in the Day-Ahead Market:
In general terms, for a given delivery period Ti, the
revenue RTi of a power producer participating in
a day-ahead market with a contracted energy EC0Ti
can be written as the income from the day-ahead
contract reduced by the imbalance penalties:
RTi = E
C0
Ti
×ΠC0Ti − Imb.Pen. (5)
Such revenue can be reformulated as the com-
bination of the income from selling the actual wind
generation E˜Ti at the spot price Π
C0
Ti
, minus the cost
δTi(E˜Ti) associated to the energy imbalance that
results from the power generation E˜Ti :
RTi = E˜Ti ×Π
C0
Ti
− δTi(E˜Ti) (6)
where the imbalance penalty function δTi is de-
fined as:
δTi(E˜Ti) = (7){
(E˜Ti − E
C0
Ti
)× (ΠC0Ti −Π
+
Ti
), E˜Ti > E
C0
Ti
(E˜Ti − E
C0
Ti
)× (ΠC0Ti −Π
−
Ti
), E˜Ti ≤ E
C0
Ti
where Π−Ti and Π
+
Ti
are the regulation prices for
negative and positive imbalance, respectively, for the
delivery period Ti. The energy imbalance is in that
case the difference (E˜Ti − E
C0
Ti
).
The determination of the regulation prices varies
according to the considered market. In our case
(i.e.: NordPool [15]) it is the result of the regulation
market, where actors with power reserves place
bids for fast production increase or decrease. The
regulation price for negative imbalance is greater
or equal to the spot price (Π−Ti ≥ Π
C0
Ti
) and the
Fig. 3: Modification of the imbalance penalty
function.
regulation price for positive imbalance is lower or
equal to the spot price (Π+Ti ≤ Π
C0
Ti
), so that the
imbalance cost function δ is generally an increasing
function of the absolute energy imbalance. Such a
mechanism encourages market participants to have
their energy contract as close as possible to their
energy delivery.
2) Combined Participation in the Day-Ahead and
Intraday Markets: For a given delivery period Ti, the
revenue RTi of a power producer participating in
a day-ahead market with a contracted energy EC0Ti ,
as well as in the intraday market with a contracted
energy EC1Ti can be written as the sum of income
from both the day-ahead and intraday contracts
reduced by the imbalance penalties:
RTi = E
C0
Ti
×ΠC0Ti + E
C1
Ti
×ΠC1Ti − Imb.Pen.
(8)
In a similar way to the previous section, such
revenue can be reformulated as a combination of
the income from selling the actual wind generation
at the spot price, reduced by penalties related to
the energy imbalances. A new imbalance penalty
function δ
′
Ti is then derived:
RTi = E˜Ti ×Π
C0
Ti
− δ
′
Ti(E˜Ti) (9)
with
δ
′
Ti(E˜Ti) = E
C1
Ti
×(ΠC0Ti −Π
C1
Ti
)+δTi(E˜Ti−E
C1
Ti
)
(10)
where δTi is the imbalance penalty function defined
in Equation 7. In the proposed model, the participa-
tion in the intraday market is considered as a modi-
fication of the imbalance penalization mechanism.
This is illustrated in Figure 3 which plots the
imbalance penalty functions δ relative to the partici-
pation in the day-ahead market and δ
′
relative to the
participation in the day-ahead and intraday markets.
In order to simplify the mathematical expressions,
the period Ti in the index is neglected hereafter
in Figure 3. The represented balancing mechanism
corresponds the one used in the NordPool area,
where balance responsible actors are only penalized
for their imbalance if this is opposite to the regulation
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measure taken by the TSO. In the specific example
in the figure, the TSO is down-regulating. When
participating only in the day-ahead market, the im-
balance penalty function is δ and only positive imbal-
ances are linearly penalized according to Equation 7
for the case of positive imbalance. When participat-
ing in both the day-ahead and intraday markets, the
imbalance penalty function becomes δ
′
, derived in
Equation 10. The first term EC1 × (ΠC0 − ΠC1) of
δ
′
is represented as a constant cost added to the δ
function. The second term δ(E˜−EC1) corresponds
to a variable change of the δ function, which is
represented as a shift by EC1 .
Participating in the intraday market in order to
reduce the imbalance penalties can be further inter-
preted in Figure 3 as getting the red δ
′
curve lower
than the blue δ curve. The constant cost can be
interpreted as the premium to pay in order to reduce
the imbalance penalties. Two parameters determine
the position of the curve δ
′
relatively to the δ curve:
EC1 and ΠC1 .
B. The Decision Making Problem
The imbalance penalty for the intraday market par-
ticipation is formulated in Equation 10 as a function
δ
′
Ti of the delivered energy E˜Ti . The imbalance
penalty is derived only after the energy delivery
since it is based on the comparison between the
delivered energy and the contracted energy.
The present work proposes a decision making
method for the optimal quantity-price bid for the
intraday market, in order to reduce the imbalance
penalties paid by the wind power producer. The par-
ticipation in the intraday market takes place before
the energy delivery and the imbalance settlement,
and, consequently, neither the future delivered wind
energy nor the imbalance price are known when
making the decision. It is thus necessary to first
estimate the imbalance penalty related to a given
intraday bid. When making a decision about intraday
bid, focus is given to the influence of the intraday bid
energy and price on the resulting imbalance penalty.
The imbalance penalty is formulated as a function
of the intraday bid energy and price, by combining
Equation 10 and the intraday market settlement
model in Equation 3:
δˆ
′
Ti(E
B1
Ti
,ΠB1Ti ) =
αˆTi × E
B1
Ti
× (ΠC0Ti −Π
B1
Ti
) +
δˆTi(EˆTi − αˆTi × E
B1
Ti
) (11)
where αˆTi is the estimated proportion of contracted
energy, δˆTi is the estimated imbalance penalty func-
tion and EˆTi is the estimated wind power production
for the period Ti. When participating in the intraday
market, the wind power producer is supposed to
have already participated in the corresponding day-
ahead market. Consequently, the day-ahead con-
tract energy EC0Ti and price Π
C0
Ti
are known.
The decision making problem about the intra-
day bid which minimizes the estimated imbalance
penalty can then be formulated as the following
optimization problem:
[
EB1∗Ti ,Π
B1∗
Ti
]
= argmin[
E
B1
Ti
,Π
B1
Ti
] δˆ′Ti(EB1Ti ,ΠB1Ti ) (12)
= argmin[
E
B1
Ti
,Π
B1
Ti
](αˆTi × EB1Ti × (ΠC0Ti −ΠB1Ti )
+ δˆTi(EˆTi − αˆTi × E
B1
Ti
))
C. Proposed Approach
The optimization problem formulated in Equa-
tion 12 is based on market price forecasts. First,
the α parameter model is based on the intraday
price distribution as described in Equation 4. Con-
sequently, estimating α relies on the estimation
of the intraday market price distribution. Similarly,
Equation 7 shows that estimations of the regulation
and spot prices are necessary for estimating the
imbalance cost function. However, market price pre-
diction is not a trivial task. Market prices are highly
volatile and hardly predictable as they may exhibit
a feature of spikes in trajectories, as described in
[16]. Consequently, the results from the general
decision-making problem might be sensitive to the
price forecast errors.
The proposed approach consists in bidding in the
intraday market in order to adjust the contracted
production using updated wind power forecasts.
Consequently, the intraday bid quantity equals the
difference between the estimated delivered energy
EˆTi during Ti and the energy contracted in the day-
ahead market EC0Ti for the same period. The quantity
bid is positive since the wind power producer is
assumed to participate in the electricity market only
with selling (offer) bid as explained in section II-B.
EB1Ti =
{
EˆTi − E
C0
Ti
, EˆTi > E
C0
Ti
0, EˆTi ≤ E
C0
Ti
(13)
The estimated delivered energy EˆTi is determined
using the most recent update of the wind power
forecast available when bidding: EˆTi = Pˆ
WF
Ti
×∆t.
For the considered intraday market, the contract
price equals the bid price. The bid price ΠB1Ti thus
determines the premium cost EC1Ti × (Π
C0
Ti
− ΠB1Ti ).
The higher is the bid price, the lower will be the
premium. However, the bid price also determines
the proportion of contracted energy αTi , according
to Equation 4. The higher the bid price, the lower
will be the probability to have the bid accepted.
The proposed bid quantity derived in Equation 13
focuses on the reduction of the positive but not
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the negative imbalance penalties. When considering
the definition of δ
′
in Equation 10 and the positive
imbalance case in the definition of δ in Equation 7,
two values of ΠB1 can be noted:
• if ΠB1 = ΠC0 , the premium is null. Furthermore,
in the case of perfect prediction of the wind
power, EB1 = E˜ − EC0 and consequently
δ(E˜ − EC1) = 0 if the bid is accepted. The
imbalance penalty is reduced to 0 after the
intraday market participation: δ
′
(EC1) = 0.
• if ΠB1 = Π+, then the imbalance penalty is un-
changed after the intraday market participation:
δ(EC1) = δ
′
(EC1).
If ΠB1 = ΠC0 , the α proportion will be lower than
if ΠB1 = Π+, since the regulation price for positive
imbalance Π+ is lower than the spot price ΠC0 .
Finally, in order to analyze the influence of the
intraday bid price on the reduction of imbalance
penalties, we propose to formulate the intraday bid
price as:
ΠB1Ti = Πˆ
+
Ti
+ β ×
(
ΠC0Ti − Πˆ
+
Ti
)
,
β ∈ [−0.2, 1.2] (14)
where Πˆ+Ti is the estimated regulation price for
positive imbalance available when participating in
the intraday market.
V. SIMULATION METHODOLOGY
A. Overall Description
As shown in Figure 4, wind power measures and
Numerical Weather Predictions (NWP) are used by
the wind power forecasting module to produce Wind
Power (WP) forecasts. Such forecasts are used as
input for bidding in the day-ahead market, according
to Equation 1. The day-ahead contract results from
the market settlement model detailed in Equation 2.
To make the intraday bid, we take into account the
day-ahead contract, updated wind power forecasts
as well as the estimated regulation price. The model
proposed for the intraday bidding is the one ex-
plained in the previous section IV-C. The intraday
market settlement based on the α proportion of
accepted energy, given in Equation 4, is used to
derive the intraday contract.
The market evaluation consists in the quantifica-
tion of the global outcome of the simulations result-
ing from the utilization of the proposed method. Such
outcome includes the revenue, the penalties and the
energy imbalances associated to the participation
of the considered wind power producer in the day-
ahead and intraday markets.
B. Wind Power Forecasts
Forecasts of wind power are used as input to
both the day-ahead and intraday market participa-
tions. In this work, such forecasts were obtained
using a state-of-the-art statistical model described in
[17]. This model aims to represent the relationship
between the wind speed forecasts and the power
output of the wind farm. This approach is often
referred as power curve modeling. Here, the power
curve is modeled by a piecewise least squares linear
fitting of the wind-speed to power relation.
The forecasts used for the intraday market are
updated forecasts, produced using as recent as pos-
sible wind power measurements as well as updated
Numerical Weather Predictions (NWP). The errors
of these updated forecasts are normally lower than
the errors of the forecasts used for the day-ahead
market participation.
C. Regulation Price Forecasts
The proposed intraday bid approach uses estima-
tions of regulation price for positive imbalance as
inputs. A first estimation of such regulation price can
be obtained by taking the mean value for a period of
time preceding the case study. This basic forecasting
approach will be denoted hereafter as the Realistic
case. The case where a perfect knowledge of the
regulation prices is also considered in this work
for assessing the sensibility of the results regarding
the regulation price forecasts. This case is denoted
as Perfect case. Advanced regulation price forecast
models can be found in [18].
VI. CASE STUDY
A. Description of the Case Study
In this study, we considered a 18 MW wind farm
located in the North West of Denmark. Results are
presented and analyzed for the participation of this
wind farm in the NordPool day-ahead and intraday
electricity markets during the period between the 1st
of January 2002 and the 31st of March 2002 [15].
To produce the wind power forecasts, Hirlam Nu-
merical Weather Predictions (NWPs) were used as
well as measured wind power from the years 2000
and 2001 as learning and testing sets, respectively.
The Hirlam NWPs are updated every 12 hours.
In NordPool, the contracts for the coming day are
traded on the day-ahead market, named Elspot. The
Elspot gate closure time is at 12:00 pm (local time) of
the preceding day. Hence, we used the last available
wind power forecasts (11:00 am of the same day)
as input to day-ahead market participation module.
Forecast horizons were selected in order to get the
forecasts for the next day.
The corresponding intraday market is the Elbas
market which takes place through a continuous trad-
ing mechanism. For the present work, intraday bids
are proposed 6 hours before the delivery period. Re-
garding the balancing settlement, balance responsi-
ble actors are only penalized for their imbalance if
these are opposite to the regulation measure taken
by the TSO. The interested reader may refer to [15]
for obtaining further information on NordPool market
rules.
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Fig. 4: Schematic representation of the overall simulation for the combined participation in the day-ahead and intraday
markets.
Fig. 5: Influence of the intraday bid price parameter
β on the intraday contract energy.
B. Results and Discussion
The aim of this section is to assess the reduction
of imbalance penalties when the proposed approach
for the combined participation in the day-ahead and
intraday markets is used. The analysis focuses on
the influence of the decision making parameter β on
the imbalance penalties.
Figure 5 describes the influence of the intraday bid
price parameter β on the intraday contract energy.
The horizontal line shows the intraday bid energy
which is independent from the parameter β. The
ratio between the contracted energy and the bid
energy represents the α proportion. The simulation
shows that increasing the bid price (through the β
parameter) decreases the α proportion of contracted
energy, for both the realistic and the prefect predic-
tion cases.
Figure 6 describes the consequences of the varia-
tion of the intraday contracted energy showed in Fig-
ure 5, on the premium and on the positive imbalance
penalties, which are derived in Equation 10. The
Fig. 6: Influence of the intraday bid price parameter
β on the premium and on the positive imbalance
penalties.
horizontal red and blue lines represent the positive
imbalance penalties and the premium when there
is no participation in the intraday market. When
the β parameter increases, the intraday bid price
increases and the intraday contracted energy de-
creases, which decreases the premium as shown
with the red curves. At the same time, the decrease
of the intraday contracted energy leads to an in-
crease of the positive imbalance penalties. These
analyses are valid for both the realistic and the
prefect prediction cases.
Finally, Figure 7 describes the consequences of
the variation of the premium and the positive imbal-
ance penalty shown in Figure 6, on the imbalance
penalties and on the market revenue. The market
revenue is normalized by the revenue that would be
obtained without imbalance penalties or with perfect
prediction of wind power. The light horizontal line
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Fig. 7: Influence of the intraday bid price parameter
β on the imbalance penalties and on the market
revenue.
represents the case when there is no participation
in the intraday market: the market revenue is then
nearly 94% of the perfect prediction revenue.
For β ≤ 0.3, the imbalance penalties resulting
from the combined participation in the day-ahead
and intraday markets are greater than the ones
relative to participating only in the day-ahead market
(no intraday). This is explained by the high premium.
For β > 0.3, the participation in the intraday market
reduces the imbalance costs.
For −0.2 ≤ β ≤ 0.9, the imbalance costs de-
crease when β increases. This is explained by the
premium decrease and the slight positive imbalance
cost increase in Figure 6. The imbalance penalties
are minimum when β is close to 0.9; they are then
reduced by approximately 16% in the realistic case
and 18% in the perfect case. The market revenue is
then increased by 1% to nearly 95% of the perfect
prediction revenue.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this study, a novel method for an efficient com-
bined participation of wind farm operators into both
the day-ahead and intraday markets is proposed.
The participation in an intraday market is formulated
as a hedging method which aims to reduce the
imbalance penalties.
The method was presented in detail and applied
to a realistic test case, where real-world measured
data and forecast obtained by a state-of-the-art wind
power forecasting model are used. The present case
study shows that the participation in the intraday
market can reduce the imbalance penalties by up
to 18%. The obtained results demonstrated a low
sensibility of the results to the regulation price fore-
casts.
A model for the settlement of continuous trading
market is proposed. This model is based on the
available data of market prices; further work should
consider the market liquidity. The influence of the
time when the intraday bid is proposed should be
considered as well.
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